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On February 25, 1607, Friar Jan Neyen, commissary-
general of the Franciscans in the Spanish Netherlands, 
secretly arrived at the Dutch town of Ryswick. Late the 
same day a carriage transported Neyen, disguised as a 
traveling salesman, to The Hague where he met with repre­
sentatives of the Dutch States-General. Neyen's visit 
initiated two months of clandestine negotiations to halt 
the fighting between the United Provinces and the Spanish 
Netherlands."'" The bargaining reached fruition in April 
with the announcement of an eight-month armistice, tempo­
rarily checking the war that had raged in the Low Countries 
2 
since the 1560s. For the next two years efforts to 
conclude a more permanent peace dominated the European 
diplomatic scene. These negotiations directly involved 
France, England, and Spain, as well as the Low Countries, 
while the rest of the continent watched in anticipation. 
Some explanation of my use of geographic terms is 
necessary. "Netherlands" and "Low Countries" refer to all 
seventeen provinces under Hapsburg rule before the revolt. 
"Spanish Netherlands" and "Flanders" apply to the ten 
southern provinces that remained loyal to Spain while 
"United Provinces," "States," and "Dutch" designated the 
rebellious North. The dates used in this essay are Old 
Style, except that the year is taken to begin January 1. 
For letters originally dated New Style, both dates are 
given. 
2 For a more complete narrative of these negotiations, 
see John Lothrup Motley, History of the United Netherlands 
from the Death of William the Silent to the Twelve Years 
Truce, 1609 (New York"! Harper and Brothers, 1900) , VI, 
pp. 60-81; and Jan den Tex, 01 denbarneveldt", 2 vols. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), II, pp. 
363-72. 
2  
The Netherlands, ruled by the Hapsburgs since the 
marriage of Mary of Burgundy to Maximilian of Austria, 
united with Spain upon the election of the Spanish king, 
Charles I, as Holy Roman Emperor in 1519. Charles 
respected the rights and traditions of the Low Countries, 
but his son Philip, who succeeded as king in 1556, imposed 
political, economic, and religious restrictions that led 
to open rebellion in the seventeen provinces. These 
states were never a homogenous unit, however, and as the 
fighting progressed, a division developed along the Rhine 
River. In the 1580s Spanish troops led by the Duke of 
Parma regained control of the southern provinces. This 
action along with expanding religious, cultural, and 
economic differences resulted in a split between the 
North and South. Despite this division, the revolt con­
tinued as the seven northern states persisted in their 
battle against Spanish armies stationed in the reconciled 
South.^ 
England and France, Spain's two major rivals, aided 
the Dutch in their struggle for independence. For France, 
3 The split in the Netherlands remains a source of 
much historical debate. For two interpretations see 
Peter Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands, 1555-1609 
(London: Williams and Forgate, Ltd., 1932) ; and Charles 
Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970 J , pp. 
1-20. 
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the revolt represented another episode in its long­
standing rivalry with the Hapsburgs. Although domestic 
problems and an eagerness to maintain the peace negotiated 
at Cateau-Cambresis (1559) kept the French from a public 
commitment, their desire to undermine Spanish interests 
in the Netherlands prompted some support for the Dutch.^ 
French involvement in the affairs of the Low Countries 
increased with the accession of Henry IV to the throne 
in 1589. Philip II, who had allied with French Catholics 
in the violent, internecine religious wars that nearly 
destroyed France, refused to acknowledge the Protestant 
Henry as king and employed the Duke of Parma to prevent 
him from occupying Paris. This ploy failed, however, and 
in 1595 Henry declared war against Philip and allied 
himself with the Dutch. 
Despite Elizabeth of England's lack of sympathy for 
rebels, a growing fear of Spanish power and a desire for 
trade in the Netherlands eventually generated English 
support for the Dutch cause. When the conquests by Parma 
and the loss of Dutch leadership after the assassination 
of William the Silent threatened to end the revolt, 
Elizabeth dispatched the Earl of Leicester and a sizeable 
army to the Low Countries. The Spanish responded to 
^Irene Mahoney, Royal Cousin, the Life of Henry IV 
of France (New York: Doubleday, 1970) , p. 103. 
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England's increased support of the rebels by declaring 
war and, in 1588, launching the ill-fated Armada. This 
series of events strengthened England's ties to the 
United Provinces. They were now formally allied with 
the Dutch and despite Elizabeth's reluctance to pursue 
actively the war with Spain, England shouldered a large 
portion of the Dutch war costs.^ 
The fighting in the Low Countries persisted into the 
early 17th century as Maurice of Nassau, commander of the 
Dutch armies after the death of his father, William the 
Silent, and Ambrogio Spinola, leader of the Spanish troops, 
exchanged a series of successes and failures. By 1604 
the fighting had reached a stalemate. Understandably 
supporters of peace emerged in both the United Provinces 
and the Spanish Netherlands. 
Peace treaties signed by France and Spain at Vervins 
in 1598 and by England and Spain at London in 1604 crippled 
Dutch chances for a military victory and further stimulated 
their desire to end the fighting. Johann Van Oldenbarneveldt, 
advocate of Holland and the most influential political 
figure in the North, led the movement for peace. Aware 
that his war-weary and financially drained nation could 
~*For an excellent interpretative work on Elizabeth's 
policy toward the Dutch, see Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and 
the Revolt in the Netherlands. 
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not wage an effective war without substantial outside aid, 
Oldenbarneveldt espoused peace on the condition that Dutch 
independence be recognized.^ 
Archduke Albert, named sovereign of the Spanish 
Netherlands by Philip II in 1598, also longed for peace. 
The presence of a Spanish army for over forty years and 
the Dutch blockade of Antwerp had ravaged the land and 
economy of Flanders. With no end to the destruction in 
sight, Albert seized the initiative for peace. Early in 
1607 he dispatched Friar Neyen to The Hague, which resulted 
in the eight-month armistice and an agreement to negotiate 
a permanent peace based on Dutch independence. 
Peace negotiations did not commence immediately, how­
ever, as the Dutch refused to enter formal talks without 
Spain's ratification of the cease-fire and acknowledgment 
of their autonomy. Despite the recognition of the Spanish 
Netherlands as a sovereign state by his father, the new 
Spanish king, Philip III, exercised considerable control 
over their affairs. Negotiations with the Archduke, no 
matter how fruitful, would be meaningless without Spanish 
7 approval. 
In early 1607 it was reported that Dutch expenditures 
exceeded their revenues by 20,000 pounds per month. 
7 
For more complete information on the roles of Arch­
duke Albert and Philip III in governing the Spanish 
Netherlands, see Charles Howard Carter, The Secret Diplomacy 
of the Hapsburgs, 1598-1625 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1964), pp. 77-87. 
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While the advocates of peace awaited news from Spain, 
the French and English involved themselves in discussions 
with the Dutch. Both Henry IV and Elizabeth's successor, 
James I, were aware that a reconciliation would affect 
them and were determined to protect their nation's interests. 
Initially Henry disapproved of the armistice. Spanish 
involvement in the Dutch war had freed him to concentrate 
on domestic affairs and to prepare for the eventual renewal 
of his struggle with the Hapsburgs. Even before the cease­
fire, Henry suggested to James that an alliance be formed 
with the States to prevent peace. However, when the English 
rejected this proposal, the French monarch was hesitant to 
intervene alone. In an effort to persuade the Dutch to 
continue the war without French aid, he dispatched a dele­
gation headed by Pierre Jeannin to The Hague. One of the 
shrewdest politicians in France, Jeannin brought to his 
post a wealth of diplomatic experience gained as Henry's 
opponent in the French civil wars. He soon found Henry's 
goals to be unrealistic; without aid, the Dutch would lose 
the war. Faced with the prospect of a united Hapsburg 
state to his north, Henry accepted Jeannin's advice and 
began to advocate a peace that guaranteed Dutch indepen­
dence . ̂ 
8 
Maurice Lee, Jr., James I and Henry IV; an Essay in 
English Foreign Policy, 1603-10 (Urbana, 111. : University 
of Illinois Press, 1970), pp. 79-83. 
7  
The sudden armistice forced James, like Henry, to 
choose between financing a war or promoting a peace. 
Although realizing that a prolongation of the conflict 
favored English interests, James was unwilling and unable 
to finance the Dutch. Moreover, he considered himself a 
man of peace and was indignant when he was not asked to 
9 
serve as a mediator. James's eagerness to convince the 
Dutch of his friendship without endangering his rapproche­
ment with Spain increased the difficulty of his decision. 
Faced with these dilemmas, James and his Secretary of 
State, Robert Cecil, attempted to formulate a foreign 
policy that would enable England to play a major role in 
the outcome of the negotiations at The Hague. This essay 
deals with the complicated and confusing story of these 
efforts. 
Although the first few months of 1607 presented James 
and Cecil with several opportunities to stymie Dutch and 
Flemish peace efforts, they showed little inclination to 
do so. In January Ralph Wim^ood, the English ambassador 
q 
Cecil to Winwood, 2 April 1607; Cecil to Cornwallis, 
12 April 1607, E. Sawyer, ed., Memorials of the Affairs 
of State in the Reigns of Q. Elizabeth and K. James I. 
Collected chiefly from the original papers of Sir . . . 
Ralph Winwood, vol. TI (London , 17 2 5 ) , pp . 288-9 and 302 - 3. 
Hereafter cited as Winwood. 
8  
in the Netherlands, reported to Cecil, Henry's desire to 
prolong the fighting through the formation of a tripartite 
alliance. The response to this overture was cool. 
William Browne, assistant-governor at the Dutch cautionary 
town of Flushing, believed the French had proposed the 
league only to make the States feel that James's backward­
ness was forcing them to peace.^ Cecil questioned the 
wisdom of risking a war that would not guarantee "some 
access to power to this Kingdom [England] to countervail 
the hazard and expense, which it would be forced to 
12 
undergo." The English reaction disappointed those who 
had looked to James for financial support to protract the 
war. Winwood lamented that the failure of England and 
France to cooperate would cause hardship for the Dutch, 
while Prince Maurice vented his anger against James who 
Winwood to Cecil, 14 January 1607, M. S. Giuseppi 
and D. McN. Lockie, eds., Report on the Manuscripts of the 
Marquess of Salisbury, vols. XIX-XX, Historical Manuscripts 
Commission publication (London, 1930-65), XIX, pp. 7-8. 
Hereafter cited as Salisbury. 
"^Browne to Lisle, 9 February 1607, W. A. Shaw and 
G. D. Owen, eds., Report on the Manuscripts of Lord De 
L'Isle and Dudley, vols. III-IV, Historical Manuscripts 
Commission publication (London, 1936-40), III, p. 349. 
Hereafter cited as De L'Isle. During the Elizabethan 
period, the Dutch allowed England to establish garrisons 
in several key coastal cities. Browne was an English 
official at one of these "cautionary town" garrisons. 
"^Cecil to Winwood, 21 February 1607, Salisbury, XIX, 
pp. 50-1. 
9  
in his opinion had weakened the war effort through 
hesitation. Maurice considered England the key to con­
tinuation of the war; France would break its peace with 
1 3  
Spain only after James promised to subsidize the States. 
Aid was not forthcoming, however. Even the announce­
ment of the cease-fire in April did not prod the English 
to pledge assistance. To the contrary, James complained 
that the Dutch had not invited him to mediate in the 
armistice negotiations."^ In response to this affront 
the king refused to dispatch an advisory council to The 
Hague. He demanded instead that the States send a delega­
tion to England to explain their actions and to suggest a 
course of action that he might follow."^ This decision 
greatly limited English contact with the Dutch during the 
months immediately following the cessation of hostilities. 
Although Ralph Winwood was stationed at The Hague, he 
received no specific instructions and took little initiative 
in negotiating with Dutch officials. Meanwhile, Pierre 
Jeannin was meeting with leaders in the States, familiar­
izing himself and Henry with their position. As a result 
"^Brown to Lisle, 24 January, 7 March 1607, De L'Isle, 
III, pp. 345, 354-7. 
"^Cecil to Winwood, 30 April 1607, Winwood, pp. 305-6. 
"'"^Cecil to Winwood, 6 June 1607 , ibid., pp. 313-5. 
1 0  
the English relied heavily upon France for information 
concerning the States. When in May, Cecil recalled Winwood 
for a briefing on the Dutch situation, he instructed him 
to consult first with Jeannin who had "better information 
of the condition of affairs. 
The English populace responded negatively to the 
announcement of the armistice. Opinion in London was 
rabidly anti-Spanish and many merchants feared that peace 
17 
would damage English trade by reviving Dutch competition. 
In spite of these pro-war sentiments, James maintained a 
public neutrality, refusing to reveal his reaction to the 
cease-fire before the arrival of the Dutch deputation. 
This policy angered Henry IV. He desired to cooperate 
with England and made several attempts through his ambas­
sador to discern James's feelings on the Dutch situation. 
The English king assured Henry of his "reciprocal desire 
to concur with him" but reaffirmed his decision to suspend 
18 
any policy commitments until his meeting with the Dutch. 
In July the Dutch delegates, Dr. Jehan Berkes and Sir 
James Maldaree, finally arrived in London. After justifying 
their nation's failure to contact England during the 
"^Cecil to Winwood, 8 May 1607, ibid., pp. 309-10. 
"^Robert Savage to Cecil, 18 April, 16 July 1607, 
Salisbury, XIX, pp. 98-9, 175. 
1 8 
Cecil to Winwood, 20 April 1607, Winwood, pp. 305-6. 
1 1  
armistice negotiations, the two commissioners requested 
that James send a deputation to join with the French in 
advising the States. Satisfied that the Dutch had made 
amends for their diplomatic improprietries, James quickly 
acquiesced, promising the deputies that, like Elizabeth, 
he would support the Dutch in their drive for freedom. 
Yet he made no specific guarantees. He limited himself 
to general assurances of his care for the States, while 
stressing that they alone could decide what course of 
19 action would best achieve independence. Even after the 
envoys emphasized that without English aid Dutch financial 
woes would force them to make peace, James pledged nothing. 
As a result the commissioners left England convinced that 
2 0 
they had found more support for peace than war. The 
Venetian ambassador Giustinian developed the same opinion. 
"The king," he reported, "as yet shows little inclination 
to upset the peace negotiations." A week later it appeared 
clear to him that James would not oppose an agreement that 
guaranteed sovereignty, since the monarch's real goal was 
21 
to keep the States out of French or Spanish hands. 
1 9 
Cecil to Cornwallis, 15 July 1607, ibid., pp. 325-7; 
Cecil to the Secretary of Scotland, August 1607, Salisbury, 
XIX, pp. 236-8. 
^Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 15/25 July 1607, 
Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of State 
Papers . . . Venice, vol. XI (London, 1900), pp. 16-17. 
Hereafter cited asVenetian. 
21 
Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 22 July/1 August, 
79 Jnlv/8 Anpust 1 607 , ibid., pp. 18-19, 21-22. 
1 2  
In late July, while the Dutch delegation was still in 
England, the long-awaited Spanish ratification of the 
armistice arrived at The Hague. The agreation was incom­
plete, however. Philip III had recognized the Archduke's 
right to negotiate a treaty in his name but failed to 
acknowledge Dutch independence. Also, he had signed the 
ratification "I, the King," a form used to address subjects, 
rather than "Philip, King," which the Dutch had requested. 
These defects led the United Provinces to return the 
2 2 
agreation to Spain, demanding amendments within six weeks. 
Hesitant to act in opposition to Philip, James decided to 
defer his newly-appointed commissioners to The Hague until 
23 
he received news of Spain's response to the Dutch demands. 
Although Cecil reckoned this answer would be slow in coming 
due to the Spanish tendency to "proceed in all things by 
degrees, taking that to be greatness," the delay was a short 
one.^ James, pressured by Henry and aware that further 
procrastination would harm relations with the Dutch, decided 
^Piero Pruili to Doge and Senate, 10/20 August 1607, 
ibid., p. 24; Browne to Lisle, 30 July, 19 August 1607, 
De L'Isle, III, pp. 389-90, 393-4. 
^Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 12/22 August, 19/29 
August 1607, Venetian, pp. 256, 257. 
24 
Cecil to the Secretary of Scotland, August 1607, 
Salisbury, XIX, pp. 236-8. 
1 3  
in late August to dispatch the deputation without news 
2 5 from Spain. 
On September 1 the English commissioners, Ralph Winwood 
and Richard Spencer, landed at Flushing and proceeded 
quickly to The Hague. With them they carried general 
instructions, which included nothing to indicate the English 
would take any initiative in pressing for peace. Winwood's 
and Spencer's primary task was to discover the attitudes of 
other involved parties toward a treaty. James refused to 
set policy without first consulting the Dutch and French, 
and, accordingly, the delegation was to commit itself to 
nothing before providing him and Cecil with knowledge of how 
things stood on all sides. French advice and Dutch desires 
would dictate English moves; Winwood and Spencer were to 
collaborate closely with Jeannin and to rely upon his 
counsel, while the Dutch were to determine their own course 
of action. The instructions urged the commissioners to 
point out the possible dangers of a treaty but cautioned 
them against opposing peace if the Dutch wanted it. If 
the States desired war they were to encourage them without 
. . .  ,  2 6  
promising increased support. 
Browne to Lisle, 9 August 1607, De L'Isle, III, 
pp. 393-4; Giustinian to Doge and Senate" 12/22 August 
1607, Venetian, pp. 25-6. 
2 6 
Instructions to Winwood and Spencer, August 1607, 
Winwood, pp. 329-35. 
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Soon after their arrival Winwood and Spencer appeared 
before the Dutch States - General pledging a continuation of 
27 
the long-standing amity between their nations. Desiring 
a more definitive statement of their allies' position, 
Dutch officials asked the French and English deputies either 
to promise aid to maintain the war or to support peace by 
advising them in negotiations. After conferring, the com­
missioners reaffirmed their willingness to follow a course 
that would most benefit the States. They refused to promise 
military aid, however, leaving the Dutch no alternative but 
28 peace. 
Several English agents in the United Provinces roundly 
criticized their nation's policies. William Browne saw 
English caution as pushing the Dutch into a peace that 
would be difficult to stop. Upset that "we [England] 
counsel them neither way," Browne feared the Dutch would 
choose "that folly, which they will . . . repent." He 
attacked Winwood and Spencer for trying only to avoid 
annoying the Dutch rather than taking strong actions to 
2 9 
prevent peace. The perception that England wanted only 
to please the States was not new. After the departure of 
? 7 
Browne to Lisle, 1 September 1607, De L'Isle, III, 
pp. 399-400. 
2 8 
Browne to Lisle, 13 September 1607; Throckmorton to 
Lisle, 13 September 1607, ibid., pp. 404-5, 405-6. 
29 
Browne to Lisle, 26 September, 1 October 1607, ibid., 
pp. 406-8, 413. 
1 5  
Winwood and Spencer from England, Giustinian commented 
that he did not expect the mission to hinder peace because 
it had been sent "chiefly to please the Dutch and ... to 
preserve that reputation, which the English desire to 
30 
possess m Holland." John Throckmorton, an aide to 
Browne, saw a strong division in the United Provinces over 
the issue of peace and suggested that James ally himself 
with war advocates, a move that would prevent peace negoti-
31 ations and, in his opinion, benefit England. These 
recommendations fell on deaf ears as the English maintained 
their noncommittal attitude throughout September and early 
October. James refused to prevent peace, yet was indisposed 
to support it forcefully. When Winwood, frustrated with 
his nebulous position at The Hague, requested further 
instructions in late September, Assistant Secretary of State 
Levinus Munke informed him that the uncertainty of the 
3 2 
situation made this impossible. Affirming this position, 
James wrote Cecil that until he could better perceive the 
course favored by other nations it would be of no benefit 
33 
to commit himself further. 
30 
Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 26 August/5 September 
1607, Venetian, p. 29. 
31 
Throckmorton to Lisle, 23 September 1607, De L'Isle, 
III, pp. 410-1. 
32 
Levinus Munke to Winwood, 17 October 1607, Winwood, 
p. 350. 
33James to Cecil, 19 October 1607, Salisbury, XIX, 
dp. 285-6. 
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This policy ended in mid-October with the arrival of 
the second Spanish agreation. The new ratification included 
a specific offer of sovereignty but remained incomplete in 
several areas. Philip again signed it "I, the King" and 
called for nullification of Dutch independence if agreement 
was not reached on other issues such as trade and religion."^ 
Despite these limitations Winwood and Spencer considered 
the Spanish offer satisfactory. In a letter to the States-
General the commissioners urged them to accept the agreation 
and begin negotiations for peace. If the States spurned the 
Spanish terms, Winwood and Spencer warned that they could 
not expect aid for a war that the English would consider 
35 
"unjustified so as it is unnecessary." These remarks won 
praise from James and Cecil, who agreed that although the 
ratification was defective in some ways, it corresponded so 
closely with what the Dutch had demanded that a rejection 
3 6 
would be dishonorable. 
Several factors led the English to this sudden and 
dramatic shift in policy. James's financial position, 
always precarious, took a turn for the worse at this time. 
Twice during October he pleaded with his Privy Council for 
34 
Cornwallis to Cecil, 14 October 1607, Winwood, pp. 
348-9; Browne to Lisle, 20 October 1607, De L'Isle, III, 
pp. 418-21. 
35 
Winwood and Spencer to the States-General, 20 October 
1607, De L'Isle, III, pp. 467-8. 
3 6 
Cecil to Cornwallis, 18 November 1607, Winwood, 
t)D. 357-9. 
1 7  
3 7  
loans to alleviate his "eating canker of want." England's 
inability to finance a war was coupled with an increasing 
awareness of Dutch and French preferences for peace. Olden-
barneveldt and other Dutch leaders who had resolved to 
negotiate were gaining ascendancy at The Hague, and even 
Zeeland, long the most warlike of the Dutch provinces, 
appeared drifting .toward pacifism. Before the arrival of 
the agreation William Browne reported peace feelings to be 
so strong in the United Provinces that he had been warned 
3 8 
not to speak in favor of war for fear of assault. Henry 
IV, unwilling to risk another war with Spain, also favored 
negotiations. This sentiment soon assumed dominance as 
Winwood and Spencer collaborated closely with Jeannin during 
the weeks preceding the arrival of Philip's ratification. 
Both the English and French trusted that their cooperation 
39 
would erase any dangers a peace might produce. Finally, 
a desire for good relations with Spain predetermined the 
English conduct. In September Cecil instructed Charles 
Cornwallis, his ambassador in Spain, to remind Philip of 
James's tendency toward peace. This, Cecil argued, was a 
"^James to Cecil, 19 October 1607, Salisbury, XIX, 
pp. 285-6. 
3 8 
Browne to Lisle, 18 September, 6 October, 14 October 
1607, De L'Isle, III, pp. 401-2, 414-5, 415-7. 
39 
Browne to Lisle, 29 August, 16 September .1607 , 
ibid., pp. 396-9, 406-8. 
1 8  
true sign of cordiality since nations traditionally seek 
to keep their enemies occupied in war/" Browne suspected 
that Winwood and Spencer designed their actions to show 
Spain that England would do nothing to hinder peace/"'' 
Cecil confirmed this suspicion suggesting to Cornwallis 
that he use England's acceptance of the agreation as a sign 
of James's sincerity to the Spanish.^ 
England's energetic advocacy of Philip's ratification 
did not last for long, however, as the unexpected flight 
of Hugh O'Neill, the Earl of Tyrone, elicited doubts con­
cerning the benefits of peace. During the 1590s Tyrone 
had led an abortive rebellion to free Ireland from Eliza­
beth's rule, and despite a pardon from James, suspicions 
of his loyalty lingered. When the Irish Earl began to 
dispute English land policies in his homeland, James 
summoned him to London, precipitating his flight from 
Ireland in September of 1607. Archduke Albert granted 
Tyrone refuge in the Spanish Netherlands, but the English 
feared he was on his way to Spain where Philip, who had 
encouraged and succoured his past revolt, would aid in 
40 
Cecil to Cornwallis, 27 September 1607, Winwood, 
pp. 340-4. 
^Browne to Lisle, 20 October 1607, De L'Isle, III, 
pp. 418-21. 
4 2 
Cecil to Cornwallis, 18 November 1607, Winwood, 
pp. 3 5 7-9. 
1 9  
fomenting another. When James demanded that Philip and 
Albert state their intentions, evasive replies strained 
43 
relations to a breaking point. The precarious situation 
roused James to order military preparations, reviving 
hopes among war advocates. The affair also aggravated 
France and England's synergetic ties. After his flight 
from Ireland, Tyrone first landed in France, and James 
immediately asked Henry to detain him. Although he 
acquiesced at first, Henry soon released Tyrone allowing 
his safe passage to Flanders. The French king maintained 
that James's petition had been unclear and that O'Neill 
was a religious rather than a political fugitive, but the 
Venetian ambassador in France suggested the motivation 
44 was actually Henry's strong dislike for James. Whatever 
the reason, the French action incensed the English monarch 
and undermined the Anglo-French cooperation that heretofore 
had made James so confident in peace. 
Reports that the Dutch were balking at the Spanish 
agreation heightened English vacillation. A strong war 
party led by Maurice of Nassua had always thrived in the 
States, and Philip's limited offer prompted many peace 
Thomas Lake to Cecil, 14 October 1607, Salisbury, 
XIX, pp. 278-9; Piero Pruili to Doge and Senate^ 10/20 
October, 18/28 October 1607, Venetian, pp. 48-51. 
^Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 21/31 October 1607, 
Venetian, pp. 52-3. 
2 0  
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supporters to alter their views. By November Winwood 
and Spencer were reporting that the Dutch would continue 
fighting if means could be found.^ This news brought 
Cecil to question his commissioner's push for peace nego­
tiations. In a November 18 letter to Thomas Edmondes, 
English ambassador to Flanders, the Secretary indicated 
the safest course would be to reserve advocacy of peace 
lest "the success prove contrary to the States' expecta-
47 
tions." Winwood, aware of the changing opinion in 
England, intimated to his friend John Chamberlain that 
although his and Spencer's reputations might be blemished, 
they had made the correct decision since His Majesty had 
4 8 no intention of going to war. Indeed, James remained 
unwilling to subsidize the Dutch war effort. Talk of an 
Anglo-Spanish marriage alliance, Philip's propositions that 
James should mediate peace negotiations, and the English 
monarch's aversion to fighting soothed tense relations with 
^Browne to Lisle, 9 November, 14 November 1607, 
De L'Isle, III, pp. 429-31, 432-3. 
^Browne to Lisle, 22 November 1607, ibid., pp. 435-7. 
^Cecil to Edmondes, 18 November 1607, Salisbury, 
XIX, pp. 327-9. 
48 
Winwood to Chamberlain, 8 December 1607, Great 
Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of State Papers 
Relating to Holland, 1603-10, vol. 66, ff. 75v-76v. 
Hereafter cited as PRO Holland. 
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Spain; and when Tyrone's threat dissipated in November, the 
49 
possibility of English involvement in a war ended. 
Uncertain what stand would best serve their interests, 
the English adopted a policy of caution; they resolved to 
evade all further commitments while allowing France to lead 
in advising the Dutch. Cecil, commenting on Winwood and 
Spencer's November 22 request for additional direction, 
suggested to James that the commissioners could best serve 
English concerns by steering a middle course between the 
extremes of supporting war and leading a peace movement.^ 
The king heeded this counsel, and on December 5 his secre­
tary, Thomas Lake, informed Cecil of a revised policy 
concerning the Spanish agreation. Winwood and Spencer were 
to avoid further advice to the United Provinces, as any 
stance would incur either Dutch or Spanish wrath. The 
States, James reasoned, should decide for themselves in 
this matter, or, if necessary, they could rely on French 
guidance/"'" A later dispatch from the Privy Council enjoined 
49 Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 18/28 November, 28 
November/5 December, 31 December/10 January 1607, Venetian, 
pp. 65-6, 70-1, 81-2. Tyrone never did go to Spain. In 
February 1608 he left Flanders for Rome, where he had been 
offered a pension by Paul V. He remained in the Eternal 
City until his death in 1616. 
^Observations on . . . the Low Countries, 1607, PRO 
Holland, ff. 85v-88. 
"^Thomas Lake to Cecil, 5 December 1607, Salisbury, 
XIX, pp. 358-60. 
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the commissioners not to be "leaders but followers." They 
were not to refuse advice to the Dutch, perpetuating the 
appearance of James's concern for their security, but should 
52 
carefully avoid any commitments. 
In no area was this disavowal of initiative more 
evident than in England's dealings apropos a defensive 
alliance. Even though the Dutch considered a league with 
James and Henry necessary for peace, the English were chary 
of the idea. Fearing that involvement in an alliance would 
threaten their peace with Spain while benefiting only the 
States, James and Cecil directed Winwood and Spencer to 
53 postpone any decision on an alliance as long as possible. 
Despite England's disinterested attitude, the Dutch 
continued to press for an agreement. In early November 
they proffered a tripartite league providing for Anglo-
French aid to the Dutch after a truce or treaty and mutual 
54 
aid if war resumed with Spain. The English saw the Dutch 
demands as exorbitant and soundly rejected their proposal. 
52 Privy Council to Winwood and Spencer, 11 December 
1607, Thomas Birch, An Historical View of the Negotiations 
between the Courts of England, France, Brussels from the 
year 1592-1667. Extracted chiefly from the State papers 
of Sir Thomas Edmondes . . . and of Anthony Bacon, 1749, 
pp. 2 74-5. 
^Instructions to Winwood and Spencer, August 1607, 
Winwood, pp. 329-35. 
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Browne to Lisle, 9 November 1607, De L'Isle, III, 
pp. 429-31. 
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After reading an abstract of the suggested league sent him 
by Cecil, James complained that the States intended "to 
take all the advantages ... to themselves" while offering 
little in return. The notion of aiding the United Provinces 
during peacetime particularly enraged the monarch; he 
intimated that if the Dutch could not support themselves, 
they were not worthy of independence and should be divided 
between England and France. Contending that Philip would 
like nothing better than to see England waste its limited 
resources, James proclaimed he would rather see the States 
fall into Spanish hands than "starve myself or mine by 
putting the meat in their [the Dutch] mouth." He insisted, 
instead, that money flow the other way, since peace would 
revive the Dutch economy. 
Despite these grievances, French support of a league 
and previous English commitments to Dutch welfare impelled 
James and Cecil to acknowledge the necessity of an alliance. 
They advocated a much more limited agreement than the 
States, however. Concerned that the Spanish might see a 
league as an attempt to reopen the fighting, the English 
desired a treaty contingent upon peace. They also favored 
replacing the proposed triple alliance with a series of 
"^James to Cecil, 1 December 1607, Salisbury, XIX, 
pp. 351 3. 
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bilateral pacts involving no English ties to France.^ A 
tripartite league, James argued, would primarily benefit 
Henry, who "because of his own age and the youth of his 
children, their legitimation, the strength of competitors 
and universal hatred borne unto him . . . seek[s] all 
57 
means of security for preventing all dangers." In late 
November Winwood and Spencer received further instructions 
from England. They were to bargain for a separate alliance, 
stating all promises of assistance in general terms. If, 
however, a more specific engagement was required, aid was 
not to exceed 6,000 men, 20 ships, and 30,000 crowns per 
year. Also, any agreement required provisions for yearly 
5 8 
support of English cautionary towns in the Netherlands. 
The Dutch considered these conditions unreasonable and 
negotiations stalled. As Winwood and Spencer looked for 
authorization to support an alliance more suitable to the 
States, Jeannin initiated negotiations for a separate 
agreement. The French promised the United Provinces 10,000 
5^Cecil to Cornwallis, 18 November 1607, Winwood, 
pp. 357-9; Cecil to Edmondes, 18 November 1607, Salisbury, 
XIX, pp. 328-9. 
5 7 
James to Cecil, 1 December 1607, Salisbury, XIX, 
pp. 351- 3. 
S 8 
Memoranda made by Cecil relative to the Treaties 
with the States-General, November 1607, ibid., pp. 483-4. 
The States' debt to England can be traced back to aid 
provided by Elizabeth in the late 16th century. In 1598 
this debt was set at 800,000 pounds with the agreement 
that the Dutch would make yearly payments and pay for the 
2 5  
foot soldiers if hostilities resumed and demanded one-half 
of this amount from the Dutch in case Henry and Philip 
went to war. The Dutch accepted these terms, and in January 
59 1608 the two nations signed a defensive pact. 
This coup was a notable propaganda victory for Henry 
IV. His decisive action increased French prestige in the 
United Provinces while magnifying skepticism of James's 
sincerity. English officials were becoming painfully aware 
that in the eight months since the cease-fire, their 
cautious policies had failed to place England in a position 
of influence at The Hague. As early as December 4 William 
Browne expressed fears that English ambivalence would allow 
France to dominate as they had during the Venetian Crisis 
of 1606.^ By January Winwood and Spencer were complaining 
maintenance of the cautionary towns. The towns were never 
financed, and after two years the Dutch discontinued pay­
ments on their debt, a situation England hoped to rectify 
in the defensive alliance. For more specific figures on 
the debt, see The State of Debt of the United Provinces by 
Way of Estimation, 14 December 1607, PRO Holland, ff. 77v. 
59 
Browne to Lisle. 11 January 1607, De L'Isle, IV, p. 3. 
^Browne to Cecil, 4 December 1607, Salisbury, XIX, 
pp. 338-9. In 1606 a squabble developed when two priests 
violated Venetian law and were brought to trial by the 
State. Claiming jurisdiction over all cases involving 
clergymen, Pope Paul V demanded that the priests be turned 
over to him. When Venice refused, he placed them under 
interdict. The nations of Europe took sides and a war 
appeared possible. Although James offered to mediate, he 
procrastinated, and it was Henry IV, aided by his personal 
emissary Cardinal Joyeuse, who negotiated a solution to 
the crisis. 
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that as a result of the Franco-Dutch alliance, the States 
consulted Jeannin more frequently on important matters.^"1" 
Desiring to satisfy both the United Provinces and Spain, 
the English had pleased neither. These nations, bothered 
by James's equivocation, began to doubt his interest in 
their welfare and turned elsewhere for counsel. By eschew­
ing all initiative, the English made French domination of 
the negotiations possible and relegated themselves to 
spectators--concerned bystanders certainly, but ones with 
less and less control over the direction of events. 
In mid-December the Dutch, influenced by French 
urgings, accepted Philip's agreation and invited the 
Spanish Netherlands to send delegates for formal peace 
6 2 
talks. This decision pleased the Archduke. He promptly 
dispatched his negotiators and asked both England and 
France to aid in the discussions. In response to this 
request, Cecil assured the Flemish that despite hostile 
acts such as Albert's harboring of Tyrone the English would 
6 3 work for peace. When negotiations convened in January 
1608, Dutch independence was the first issue discussed. 
^Thomas Ogle to Cecil, 4 January 1608, ibid., XX, 
pp. 2 - 4. 
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Cecil to Edmondes, 14 January 1608, Salisbury, XX, 
pp. 19-20. 
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The States demanded a more specific recognition of sover­
eignty before proceeding to other matters, a stand many 
believed would prove unacceptable to the Archduke. Fearful 
that others might blame James if the negotiations stalled, 
the Privy Council directed Winwood and Spencer to warn the 
United Provinces not to press their demands too strongly. 
England's anxiety was needless, however, for Albert quickly 
conceded the Dutch request.^ Although many were optimistic 
that this would soon bring peace, the question of Dutch 
trade in the Indies emerged as a new impediment. The States 
demanded free trade rights in the Spanish colonial world; 
Spain, on the other hand, insisted upon immediate Dutch 
withdrawal from these areas. Despite this conflict the 
English expected the parties to reach a quick compromise. 
Neither side was eager to adjust their demands, however, 
and by early February the talks had reached an impasse.^ 
Meanwhile, the English, realizing further hesitation 
would destroy their credibility in the United Provinces and 
guarantee Henry's eminence, resumed efforts to conclude a 
defensive alliance. Even with the French stimulus, negoti­
ations proceeded slowly. The Dutch continued to press for 
^Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 21/31 January 1608, 
Venetian, pp. 89-90; Privy Council to Winwood and Spencer, 
Winwood, 3 February 1608, pp. 369-74. 
^Ogle to Cecil, 7 February 1608; Noel Caron to Cecil, 
February 1608, Salisbury, XX, pp. 57-8, 91 2. 
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peacetime aid and wanted their commitment set at one-half 
the English promise. Moreover, they asked James to post­
pone debt payments for several years after the peace. 
Although the English added 400 horses to their offer of 
aid and agreed to cut the first two debt increments to 
30,000 pounds they repudiated peacetime support and a 
Dutch commitment less than two-thirds. James also rejected 
a suggestion that any French aid to the States be credited 
against Henry's debt to England. This would have enlarged 
the Dutch treasury, increasing their ability to repay 
England, but James held firm, claiming it was merely anothe 
French attempt to gain Dutch favor at his expense.^ 
Winwood and Spencer were ambiguous in their meetings 
with the Dutch, gaining praise from James for their refusal 
"to engage him too far by giving the States certain hopes, 
6 7 or to discourage them by the contrary." Negative reac­
tions emanating from Madrid and Brussels concerning the 
proposed league may have prompted this caution. James and 
his ambassadors, concerned that the negotiations might 
rupture their peace with Spain, reminded Philip and Albert 
that the alliance's only purpose was to encourage peace, 
but as the talks dragged on, opposition intensified. 
^Browne to Lisle, 11 January 1608, De L'Isle, IV, 
p. 33. 
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Privy Council to Winwood and Spencer, 20 March 1608, 
Winwood, pp. 376-8. 
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Philip and the Archduke attacked England for allying with 
rebels and putting unwarranted restrictions on the Treaty 
of London.^ This criticism angered Cecil, who considered 
the league an attempt to further peace and therefore 
beneficial to Spain. He insisted the claims were unfounded; 
since the alliance went into effect only if Spain violated 
their proposed peace with the States, it posed no threat to 
the Spaniards as long as Philip honored his promises. To 
relieve further suspicions, Cecil tendered a similar defen­
sive pact to Philip and Albert while Winwood and Spencer 
urged the Dutch to inform the Archduke's delegates that 
69 without a defensive alliance peace was out of the question. 
Difficulties existed but the completion of an agreement 
was never in doubt. The Dutch saw a league as imperative 
for a stable peace, and despite fears of Spanish reprisals, 
James was reluctant to drive the States into further 
70 dependence on France. In the end, both parties were 
willing to compromise, and in June an Anglo-Dutch alliance 
^Guistinian to Doge and Senate, 17/27 March 1608, 
Venetian, pp. 109-10. 
69 Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 21 May 1608, Winwood, 
pp. 403-5; Cecil to Edmondes, 4 May, 31 May 1608, Salisbury, 
XX, pp. 152-3, 175-6; also see Cecil's May letters to 
Cornwallis in Winwood. 
70 Privy Council to Winwood and Spencer, 20 March 1608, 
Winwood, pp. 376-8. 
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was concluded. The English would provide 10,000 soldiers, 
400 horses, and 20 ships if Spain violated the peace; the 
Dutch were to provide two-thirds of this amount. The 
agreement also included an English refusal to subsidize 
the United Provinces during peacetime and a Dutch promise 
to repay their debt in yearly increments of 60,000 pounds 
71 beginning two years after the peace. 
While the English and Dutch haggled over a league to 
guarantee peace, problems concerning the Indies trade 
increased the likelihood of war. The States continued to 
insist on full trade rights in the Indies, threatening a 
72 
resumption of fighting if their demands were not met. 
Noel Caron, the Dutch agent in England, considered yielding 
on this issue too dear a price to pay especially since, in 
his view, the United Provinces had proved themselves 
73 
stronger than Spain on the battlefield. Likewise, the 
Spanish remained firm in their request for Dutch withdrawal, 
claiming that the States' presence in the Indies would 
71 Principal heads of the league to be concluded 
betwixt His Majesty and the States, 31 May 1608, ibid., 
p. 409; Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 10/17 April 1608, 
Venetian, pp. 123-4. 
^Ogle to Cecil, 21 February, 1 March 1608, PRO 
Holland, ff. 96v-98, ff. 98v-100. 
^Caron to Cecil, 25 February 1608, Salisbury, XX, 
p. 83. 
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oblige them to sail fully armed.^ Philip's demands for 
religious freedom in the Netherlands made peace appear 
even more unattainable. The States argued that their 
sovereignty prevented any outside regulation of domestic 
7 5 matters and unequivocally refused. By April Dutch and 
Spanish immoderation had brought the negotiations to a 
standstill. To break this deadlock, Archduke Albert, who 
had shown a willingness to accommodate the States, dis­
patched Friar Neyen to sound out Philip's attitude toward 
76 compromise. 
The dwindling possibility of peace increased English 
confusion as to what policy would best serve their interests. 
Although Winwood and Spencer continued to support a treaty 
and were consoled in knowing that the Spanish and Dutch 
also desired peace, many Englishmen began expressing doubts 
that they had allowed negotiations to proceed too far. 
Cecil chastised his commissioners for supporting a peace 
likely "to add but trouble and care unto us in these parts." 
He hesitated to suggest subversion of the talks, however; 
concern for relations with Spain and the States necessitated 
^Girolamo Sorzano to Doge and Senate, 19 February, 
1 March 1608, Venetian, p. 101. 
75 Cornwallis to Privy Council, 2 April 1608, Winwood, 
pp. 384-5. 
^Caron to Cecil, 25 February 1608, Salisbury, XX, 
p. 83. 
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7  7  caution. Giustinian believed by late March that the 
English no longer wanted peace if it meant free trade for 
the Dutch. The Treaty of London had denied England this 
concession, and they did not relish seeing such an advan-
7 8 tage pass into the hands of a rising commercial power. 
A few weeks later Cornwallis exhorted Cecil to oppose peace. 
"The considerations which heretofore had moved us to affect 
the peace," he wrote, "are . . . changed into more forcible 
reasons to determine a continuance of war." According to 
Cornwallis, a treaty might bring some benefits, but it 
would leave the Spanish "without a seat of war" and mean 
79 gains for Catholicism. 
In early June English attention shifted dramatically 
to events in France. News arrived in London that a Spanish 
mission, headed by Don Pedro de Toledo, had arrived in 
Paris to arrange a Franco-Spanish marriage alliance. In 
an attempt to gain French support for a peace without Dutch 
independence, Don Pedro suggested a match between the 
Spanish Infanta and a French prince, with the Netherland's 
7 7 
Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 20 March 1608, Winwood, 
pp. 378-9; Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 20/30 ApriT^ 4/14 
May 1608, Venetian, pp. 126-7, 132-5. 
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Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 17/27 March 1608, 
Venetian, pp. 110-1. 
79 Cornwallis to Cecil, 2 April 1608, Winwood, pp. 
384-5. 
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as a dowry upon the death of the childless Archduke and 
8 0 his wife Isabella. This proposal engendered great con­
sternation in England. The uncomforting thoughts of an 
alliance between the two Catholic nations and hostile 
control of the Low Countries redoubled cries for the 
resumption of war aid to the Dutch. Winwood's contact in 
London, John More, underscored the need to "strike close 
hands with the States" to prevent consummation of the 
marriage alliance from causing a Dutch defeat. A league 
with the States, More maintained, would also assure the 
Dutch of English friendship at a time when they doubted 
French sincerity. 
More held little hope that James would act, however. 
Because the king inclined toward peace and could not afford 
81 to finance a war, he believed his suggestions "but wind." 
Henry Neville, another of Winwood's associates, also pre­
dicted inaction. James, he charged, was "afraid of every 
shadow" least it should anger Spain and would make no effort 
8 2 
to resuscitate the Dutch war effort. As anticipated, the 
English leaders sustained their position. James had always 
had qualms about aid to the States, and when a small Irish 
8 0 
Cornwallis to Privy Council, 4 June 1608, ibid., 
pp. 409-10; William Resould to Cecil, 25 May 1608, Salisbury, 
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Thomas More to Winwood, 25 June 1608, Winwood, pp. 
412-3. 
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uprising occurred in early June, fears that Philip might 
aid the rebellion made him "more determined than ever to 
avoid mixing in anything that would cause annoyance to 
8 
Spain." Although Cecil was becoming convinced that a 
continuation of hostilities would be more beneficial than 
peace, he too saw it as unwise to begin advocating war 
while both Spain and the States supported peace. Both men 
sensed Don Pedro's proposals would come to nothing, making 
action unnecessary. It was unlikely that Henry, noted for 
his pragmatism, would sacrifice friendship and influence 
84 
with the Dutch for Spanish promises of future benefits. 
The mission did, in fact, prove to be a fiasco. Not an 
insignificant factor in its failure was Don Pedro's 
handling of the negotiations. In his first formal meeting 
with Henry he berated the French for their support of the 
States; later the marriage alliance was offered on the 
condition that France encourage the United Provinces to 
accept peace without independence. These intimidating 
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Don Pedro muddled his assignment, but his mere presence 
in Paris strained relations between Henry and James. That 
France even considered the Spanish proposals intensified 
distrust of Henry and fanned religious prejudices in England. 
To many, France was unreliable as long as its king remained 
"a good son to the mother of Rome."^ Even the rejection of 
Don Pedro's scheme continued to arouse suspicion. Henry, it 
was thought, dismissed the offer to ingratiate himself with 
8 7 
the Dutch. This animosity soon faded, and for a time it 
appeared as if the Spanish mission might actually bring 
about a formal Anglo-French alliance. Despite his personal 
distaste for James, Henry had always deemed England a more 
logical ally than Spain and espoused a tripartite league to 
tie England, France, and the Dutch in a mutual defensive 
pact. After Don Pedro's arrival, Antoine Boderie, the 
French ambassador to England, revived the idea in hopes 
that dread of a hostile alliance would make James more 
8 8 amenable to a union. Cecil reacted favorably to this 
proposal, and informal talks were initiated. Difficulties 
^Cornwallis to Cecil, 30 July 1608, ibid, pp. 420-1. 
8 7 Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 26 July 1608, ibid., 
pp. 421 3. 
8 8 
Privy Council to Winwood and Spencer, 7 August 1608, 
ibid. , pp. 427-9. 
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quickly arose, however, as the English opposed a French 
suggestion to encompass the United Provinces in the league. 
When the failure of Don Pedro's efforts became apparent, 
James and Cecil lost all interest in the project and 
Boderie ceased expounding it.^ 
In August attention again focused on The Hague as 
Friar Neyen arrived from Spain with instructions. Philip 
remained firm in his demands; Dutch autonomy would be 
withheld unless the States granted freedom of religion and 
90 
relinquished claims to the Indies trade. The United 
Provinces rejected these demands, and the collapse of the 
negotiations appeared imminent. Cecil, certain of peace 
in a late July dispatch to Winwood and Spencer, now pre-
91 dieted the disruption of talks. The Archduke's negoti­
ators, led by Ambrogio Spinola, refused to allow peace to 
slip away so easily. However rigid in his requirements 
for a treaty, Philip had left open the possibility of a 
long truce, and Spinola seized this opportunity to save 
92 
the negotiations. France and England quickly supported 
o g 
Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 11/21 August, 17/27 
August 1608, Venetian, pp. 160, 163. 
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91 Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 26 July 1608, ibid., 
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his attempts to arrange a truce now that permanent peace 
seemed unattainable. Henry had always preferred war if 
a treaty could not be contracted, but in mid-1608, Jeannin 
convinced him that unless he intended to actively enter 
the war a truce was the only way to prevent Hapsburg con-
93 trol in the Low Countries. Despite its growing doubts 
respecting peace, England also endorsed a long truce. 
James, aware that he could not finance the Dutch, perceived 
that a resumption of fighting would result in either Spanis 
or French control over the United Provinces. If the States 
remained unaided, war posed much more of a threat to his 
94 interests than peace under any conditions. The English, 
to a large extent, were simply reacting to the French lead. 
Realizing Don Pedro's presence in Paris and Jeannin's 
influence in the States gave France special access to 
Spanish and Dutch attitudes, James considered Henry's chang 
of heart a reflection of the two nations' opinions of the 
truce. By opposing France's decision, the monarch believed 
England would be resisting Spanish and Dutch desires, 
something he had been avoiding throughout the negotiations. 
Accordingly, the Privy Council enjoined Winwood and Spencer 
to concur with Jeannin in pressing for acceptance of a long 
93 Lee, James I and Henry IV, p. 86. 
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Privy Council to Winwood and Spencer, 7 August, 
8 October 1608, Winwood, pp. 427-9, 433-5. 
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truce. The commissioners were to use their own discretion 
on specific provisions, but James, convinced the French 
would do nothing to harm their relations with Spain or the 
States, expected no differences of opinion. To handle 
Dutch opposition of a truce, Winwood and Spencer were to 
remind them that they were in no position to refuse; 
failure to negotiate would force them into a disastrous 
war without English or French aid. These arguments, along 
with a previous pledge to apply the defensive alliance to 
95 
a truce, temporized much of the Dutch resistance. 
Although the English and French envoys collaborated 
closely over the next several months, all parties recog­
nized France as the leading advocate of peace. Winwood and 
Spencer took a back seat as the Dutch, Spanish, and Flemish 
96 
deputies turned to Jeannin for direction. England's 
subordinate position became a public embarrassment to James 
as the result of an oversight by Jean Richardot, head of 
the Flemish deputation at The Hague. In early October the 
Archduke ordered Richardot to return to Brussels, and when 
vacating his room, the minister inadvertently left secret 
instructions from Albert in the drawer of his writing 
table. These directions, which were passed to the Dutch 
95 
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States-General and eventually printed, charged Richardot 
to place more confidence in the French than in the English. 
In response to this affront, James lashed out against 
others. He attacked the French for using the negotiations 
to increase their glory and accused the Archduke and Philip 
of ignoring English efforts to secure peace. The monarch 
commanded Winwood and Spencer to inform Richardot that 
Albert's preference for French counsel gave England little 
98 reason to continue supporting his quest for a truce. 
Actually, James's dissatisfaction had the opposite 
affect. The English soon intensified their defense of the 
truce in an effort to convince Oldenbarneveldt, Philip, and 
Albert of their industry for peace. In late October Winwoo 
delivered a remonstrance to the States-General informing 
them in absolute terms that no aid would be forthcoming if 
a truce was not accepted. James, he emphasized, was "too 
just, too religious and too peaceful to foment a war, which 
however just to begin with would show as unjust from the 
99 
refusal of peace." The English exhortations became so 
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numerous and forceful over the next few weeks that Jeannin 
found it necessary to restrain Winwood and Spencer in their 
sudden exuberance for peace. England's firm stand even 
impressed William Browne. In a letter to his superior, 
Viscount Lisle, he apologized for his previous opposition 
to peace, contending that he "had never till now known our 
king's mind. 
The English pleadings did not shake the conviction 
among many in the United Provinces that James would not 
allow the States to fall into inimical hands. Led by 
Maurice of Nassau, these war advocates resisted a truce. 
Opposition was particularly strong in Zeeland where they 
refused to discuss a settlement unless Spain recognized 
102 
Dutch independence for the duration of the peace. Albert 
had conceded this point in September and claimed to speak 
for Spain as well, but Philip's acknowledgment was slow in 
coming. To soften Dutch reluctance, the English and French 
deputies appeared before the States-General and repeated 
their threat to withdraw all aid if the Dutch failed to 
"*"^Lee, James I and Henry IV, p. 126. 
"^"'"Browne to Lisle, 23 October 1608, De L' Isle, IV, 
pp. 64-5. 
1 0? 
Browne to Lisle, 7 November 1608, ibid., pp. 70-1. 
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accept a truce. By mid-November Maurice and the Zee-
landers had yielded to this pressure. They embraced truce 
negotiations on the condition that no final agreement 
104 
could be reached without Spanish approval. 
England's sudden and tenacious resolve for peace had 
revived its sagging credibility at The Hague, but two 
incidents soon caused a renewed questioning of James's 
reliability. In November Archduke Albert, on orders from 
Madrid, dispatched Ferdinando de Giron to thank James for 
his staunch peace advocacy. The Dutch and French suspected, 
however, that de Giron's real objective was to press for a 
moderation of Dutch sovereignty demands. These mis­
givings multiplied when on November 29 Richardot wrote a 
letter identifying James as responsible for the Spanish 
delay in recognizing an independent United Provinces. 
Philip, Richardot noted, had been willing to accept Dutch 
sovereignty until James offered to secure a twenty-year 
truce without mention of independence. The English 
103 
Browne to Lisle, 5 September 1608; Proclamation 
from the States, 20 October 1608, ibid., pp. 41-4, 54-5; 
Antonio Foscarini to Doge and Senate, 10/20 November 1608, 
Venetian, pp. 190-1. 
•^^Extract from the Register of the Resolutions of the 
Council of State, 13 November 1608, De L'Isle, IV, pp. 74-5. 
"^^Edmondes to Cecil, 16 November, 23 November 1608, 
Salisbury, XX, pp. 268, 270. 
^"^Foscarini to Doge and Senate, 12/22 December 1608 , 
Venetian, p. 203; Edmondes to Cecil, 30 November 1608, 
De L1 Isle, IV, pp. 318-20. 
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vehemently denied these charges. Claiming this had never 
been "so much as imagined by His Majesty, much less 
intimated by any of his ministers," Cecil attacked Richardot 
for spreading deliberate falsehoods to encourage distrust 
of James. Thomas Edmondes maintained that the Flemish had 
contrived the entire episode to disgrace James rather than 
the Archduke in case Philip refused to recognize the States' 
independence. 
In truth, there is little evidence to uphold Richardot's 
allegations. In mid-November Jeannin and Winwood, weary of 
Philip's hesitancy, had sent Charles de l'Aubespine, abbe 
de Preaux, one of Jeannin's aides, to Brussels to ask Albert 
what the Spanish intentions were. The Archduke told the 
envoy that Don Pedro de Toledo, not James, was responsible 
for suggesting to Philip that a truce might be possible 
without the distasteful concession of autonomy. Later, the 
Flemish altered the story and implicated Charles Cornwallis. 
Preaux cautioned Albert against espousing this type of 
agreement, emphasizing that neither France nor England 
would advocate a truce that did not recognize a Dutch 
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state. Furthermore, Giron met with little success when 
107Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 23 December 1608, 
Winwood, pp. 466-7; Edmondes to Cecil, 21 December 1608, 
De L'Isle, IV, pp. 321-3. 
108Edmondes to Cecil, 30 November, 7 December 1608, 
De L'Isle, IV, pp. 318-20, 320-1; Cecil to Winwood and 
Spencer, 23 December 1608, Winwood, pp. 466-7. 
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he asked the English monarch to procure more favorable 
conditions for the Spanish. James berated the legate, 
declaring he would take no part in such a plan. According 
to the English king, nothing would bring peace more quickly 
than Philip's endorsement of the Archduke's stand."'"®® 
True or not, Richardot's accusation temporarily dis­
tressed the cooperative relationship between France and 
England that had so effectively expounded the truce. Henry 
viewed James's alleged offer as a further example of English 
duplicity. England's desire to please Spain, he believed, 
had caused them to deceive their allies and chance the 
breakdown of negotiations. The English distrusted French 
intentions as well. Henry's quickness to blame James for 
the slowness in the truce talks induced Edmondes to remark 
that "the French king plays not all his balls above the 
line," while Cecil wondered why Preaux had agreed with 
Richardot's charges."^® Eventually Anglo-French relations 
stabilized. The increased skepticism of England's sincerity 
moved James to commit himself even more closely to the 
French course of action. Anxious to reestablish his repu­
tation as a peace advocate, James assured Henry in early 
109Cecil to Edmondes, 28 December 1608, Salisbury, 
XX, p. 285; Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 31 December 1608, 
Winwood, pp. 469-71. 
^^Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 23 December 1608, 
Winwood, pp. 466-7; Edmondes to Cecil, 7 January 1609, 
De L'Isle, IV, p. 324. 
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January that he would "never sever himself from His Most 
Christian Majesty's [Henry's] prudent views.""'"'''"'" 
Despite the commotion over James's actions, progress 
toward a truce continued. In December, while the tumult 
was at its height, the Dutch extended the cease-fire for 
112 two months, hoping that a settlement could soon be reached. 
Meanwhile, irritated by Spain's slowness to acknowledge 
sovereignty, Archduke Albert dispatched his confessor, 
Inigo Brizuela, to sway Philip on this issue. His efforts 
were not wasted, for on January 19 the Spanish monarch 
finally agreed to concede Dutch independence for the length 
of a truce. Though they desired more, the Dutch accepted 
this offer, leaving a trade agreement as the last obstacle 
113 to the long awaited peace. 
As a truce appeared more and more certain, James and 
Cecil inveighed against the perception that England had 
delayed negotiations. This attitude, Cecil feared, :\rould 
deprive James of his credit due for advancing the truce, 
Antonio Foscarini to Doge and Senate, 4/14 January, 
31 January/10 February 1609, Venetian, pp. 217-8, 229-30. 
112Edmondes to Cecil, 21 December 1608, Salisbury, XX, 
p. 284. 
113Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 27 December 1608/ 
6 January; Soranzo to Doge and Senate, 23 January/2 Feb­
ruary 1609; Correr to Doge and Senate, 17/27 February 1609, 
Venetian, pp. 196, 226, 237-8. 
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and the secretary ordered his ministers to take all possible 
measures to demonstrate England's craving for peace. James 
denied emphatically that he had promised to secure a truce 
without sovereignty, arguing this was inconceivable con­
sidering Dutch demands. Concern for credibility led 
England to adhere even more closely to the French line. In 
a March 2 note that acknowledged Jeannin's preeminence, the 
Privy Council advised Winwood and Spencer to remain in close 
contact with the French minister, concuring with his deci 
sions at all times. 
A settlement on the trade issue proved elusive to the 
negotiators, now gathered at Antwerp. Albert, following 
Philip's instructions, generally recognized Dutch trade 
rights in areas controlled by Spain but withheld specific 
mention of the Indies. This was unacceptable to the States 
and an impasse developed.*"''^ The English and French com­
missioners attempted to break this stalemate by pledging 
to guarantee a Dutch presence in the Indies if the Arch­
duke's deputies would give assurance that Albert interpreted 
the general trade provision to include the area. Richardot 
"'""'"^Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 4 February 1609; 
Cecil to Cornwallis, 12 February 1609, Winwood, pp. 476-7, 
478-9. 
115Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 2 March 1609, ibid., 
pp. 481-3. 
116Correr to Doge and Senate, 17/27 February 1609, 
Venetian, pp. 2 37-8. 
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offered an oral promise to this affect, making the trade 
article acceptable to all parties. Although James had 
originally demanded a written guarantee, French pressures 
and fears that any delays would be blamed on England forced 
him to warrant Dutch trade based on Richardot's oral 
117 
promise. The settlement of the Indies trade cleared 
the way for peace. On March 29, 1609 the negotiators 
signed an agreement that stopped hostilities for twelve 
years. The Twelve Years Truce was a significant victory 
for the United Provinces. They received recognition of 
their sovereignty, forfeited no territory, secured trade 
rights in the Indies, and made no concessions to Cathol­
icism. In short, the Dutch had won all they could real-
118 istically expect but permanent peace. 
Despite numerous claims to the contrary, England 
exerted little influence during the two years of negotia­
tions leading to the Twelve Years Truce. Fearful that 
their national interests would be harmed if either the 
Dutch or the Spanish were antagonized, James and Cecil 
adopted a policy of equivocation, which allowed the French, 
consistent in support of peace, to direct the course of 
117Winwood to Privy Council, 16 March 1609; Cecil 
to Winwood and Spencer, 20 March 1609, Winwood, pp. 491-2, 
488-90. 
118Birch, An Historical View of the Negotiations, 
p. 293; also see Lee, James I and Henry IV, pp. 133-4. 
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events. In early 1607 English refusals to maintain the 
States' war effort made negotiations a necessity, but, 
reluctant to anger anyone, James avoided a strong stand. 
Slow to send a deputation to The Hague and hesitant to 
commit them to action, the English enabled Jeannin to 
assume the dominant role as mediator. Their ardor to please 
the United Provinces and Spain generated an endorsement of 
peace negotiations after the first Spanish agreation 
arrived in October, but as events and attitudes altered, 
the English balked in their support. By the end of 1607 
James's and Cecil's unwillingness to offend others led them 
to forsake all initiative in the negotiations. Hoping to 
avoid major errors, England chose to respond to rather than 
dictate events at The Hague. Throughout 1608 the English 
moved cautiously, committing themselves when French actions 
made it necessary. They concluded a defensive alliance 
with the States but only after the Dutch, frustrated by 
James's equivocation, had agreed to a pact with Henry. 
When the French threw their support behind a truce, England 
quickly followed, convinced that Henry's position mirrored 
Spanish and Dutch desires. Suspicions generated by the 
Giron mission and Richardot's actions drove James to 
intensify his support of the truce, and as the discussions 
moved inexorably to a conclusion, he adhered even more 
closely to Henry in expectation of a share in credit for 
peace. 
4 8  
It was the French, however, who determined the out­
come of the negotiations. As he had in the Venetian Crisis 
of 1606, James rejected a leadership role while Henry, 
certain of what he wanted, served notice that he would 
direct the course of events in Europe. In the light of 
circumstances later in 1609, James's ambivalent policies 
assumed a greater significance. When a controversy devel­
oped over the Cleves-Julich succession less than six months 
after the signing of the Twelve Years Truce, James again 
passively stood by as Henry brought the continent to the 
brink of war in his drive to dismember the House of 
Hapsburg. 
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